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Where Was Canada?
The Canadian Military Contribution to the 
British Commonwealth Second World War 
Campaign in North Africa 
 
A n d r e w  s t e wA r t
Abstract : The campaign fought by predominantly British Commonwealth 
forces in North Africa during the Second World War, in many respects, 
represented a final example of imperial solidarity and unity. Whilst the 
United States participated during the final stages prior to the surrender 
of Axis forces in May 1943, it was Britain and its Empire that provided 
most of the resources and manpower and contested most of the battles. 
Canada, however, played only a relatively minor part and this paper 
seeks to examine the associated decision-making process that took place 
in London and Ottawa and discuss the tensions that arose.
With the final battle of El Alamein drawing to a close on 15 November 1942 a radio broadcast by the journalist L.S.B. 
Shapiro, heard nationally on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
network, drew its listeners’ attention to North Africa and the offensive 
that had just been fought. Having highlighted that it had been a 
largely Commonwealth military coalition operating in that theatre, 
the broadcast noted that Canadians were not part of it and asked 
“What reason lies behind the extraordinary fact that the first of all 
overseas armies to reach the European theatre—remains the last 
to go into action?”1 This was not the first time this question had 
1  “SHAPIRO broadcast for 15 Nov 1942,” Extract, Publicity—General, PA 3–7, 
A.G.L. McNaughton Papers, MG 30, E133, Series III, Vol. 144, Library and Archives 
Canada (LAC).
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been asked. For more than two years the British Empire’s principal 
military effort had been watched keenly by many Canadians who 
could not understand why their own military forces were not 
involved. The failure to join the battles fought in the Western Desert 
and the Middle East was a result of the policy pursued by Prime 
Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King supported, from mid-1940 
onwards, by his two senior military commanders Harry Crerar and 
Andrew McNaughton. Whilst the political leader was concerned 
about the potential domestic implications of committing troops 
overseas, the officers were equally content to approve the opportunity 
offered to them by their British counterparts not to take part in the 
Mediterranean campaign. Canadian troops would instead garrison 
the United Kingdom in the face of a potential German invasion and 
this allowed the opportunity to use the time and space provided by 
an increasingly spurious threat to train and develop the huge military 
organisation that would eventually play a leading role in the invasion 
of Europe. With all of the principals in agreement, this mutually 
beneficial understanding, unpalatable as it was to some parts of 
domestic public opinion, meant that the victory in the North Africa 
would be won by a British-led coalition that was almost entirely 
lacking any Canadian involvement.2
As one of Canada’s most distinguished recent historians 
noted more than forty years ago, in September 1939 there “was 
no enthusiasm” for what he termed as “a war of limited liability.”3 
Indeed, this analysis has been universally accepted since the first 
wartime examination of Canadian military policy by Colonel Charles 
Stacey, later to become “Canada’s foremost military historian,” and 
then expanded upon in the subsequent substantial body of work he 
2  John Nelson Rickard, The Politics of Command: Lieutenant-General A.G.L 
McNaughton and the Canadian Army, 1939–1943 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2010), 46–53.
3  J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government 
1939–1945 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975), 19, 420.
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produced.4 Yet at the time there was plenty of evidence to support 
the view that a great deal was in fact being done. A report in the 
journal of the London-based Royal United Services Institution, 
published before the outbreak of the Second World War, concluded 
that Canada’s re-armament plans seemed broad and “directed in 
part towards objects other than those of purely local defence.”5 It 
noted that its resources, both in terms of manpower and industrial 
capacity, were far greater than those of any of the other dominions 
and in a prolonged struggle these could prove “a decisive factor in 
achieving victory.” From the earliest days of the war there was also 
the evidence offered by the Empire Air Training Plan, an agreement 
to use the safety of Canadian skies to prepare airmen who would 
then be able to launch the bombing campaign over occupied Europe 
which was prominently reported on by the media throughout the 
British Empire.6
This apparent dichotomy was recognised by those British diplomats 
tasked with managing relations between London and Ottawa. The 
privately circulated views of Lord Tweedsmuir, the British governor-
general, described Canada’s war effort as “half-detached and half-
embroiled.”7 Sir Gerald Campbell, Britain’s high commissioner, wrote 
back to London in December 1939 that the “official attitude to the 
war is lukewarm; it is a fact which we ourselves know only too well, 
it is a fact which is clear to the people of the United States. I think 
4  “Biography—Colonel Charles Perry Stacey, O.C., O.B.E., C.D., B.A., A.M., 
Ph.D., LL.D, D.Litt., D.Sc. Mil, F.R.S.C., 1906–1989,” National Defence and the 
Canadian Forces, Directorate of History and Heritage, available: http://www.cmp-
cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/adh-sdh/bio/index-eng.asp [accessed 25 April 2016]. See 
C.P. Stacey, The Military Problems of Canada: A Survey of Defence Policies and 
Strategic Conditions Past and Present (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1940); Colonel 
C.P. Stacey, Six Years of War—Volume 1, The Army in Canada, Britain and the 
Pacific (Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War) (Ottawa: 
Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1957); C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and 
Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939–1945 (Ottawa: The Queen’s 
Printer, 1970).
5  “Re-Armament in the Dominions,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 
84, no. 534 (1939), 262.
6  Andrew Stewart, “The British Government and the 1939 Negotiations for the 
Empire Air Training Plan,” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of 
International Affairs 93, no. 377 (October, 2004), 739–754; Kent Fedorowich, “Sir 
Gerald Campbell and the British High Commission in Wartime Ottawa, 1938–1940,” 
War in History 18, no. 3 (July, 2011), 357–385.
7  John Buchan, Memory Hold-the-Door (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1945), 
289.
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the latter will again regard Canada as a warrior nation when they see 
Canadian forces in the front line: but not if they consist of only one 
Division and the remnants of a watered down air training scheme: 
and that I feel bound to conclude, is all that they will see, so long 
as Mr Mackenzie King’s Government remains in power ... Whilst it 
is true that no one but [him] could have brought Canada into this 
war with such unanimity on all sides, it is equally true that we shall 
never get anywhere with the present Prime Minister in this war.”8 At 
this stage responsibility for this apparent contradiction came down to 
Mackenzie King who, from well before the war’s outbreak, had argued 
for a restricted level of engagement based upon an appreciation that 
was “wrapped up in that theory of limited liability which [the British 
military thinker Basil] Liddell Hart was shortly to prescribe.”9 This 
called for a reliance on blockade, economic warfare, and only a token 
8  Minute by Cavendish Bentinck (Foreign Office), 12 January 1940, FO371/25224, 
The National Archives, London (TNA).
9  Adrian Preston, “Canada and the Higher Direction of the Second World War, 
1939–1945,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 90, no. 637 (February, 
1965), 30, 33.
January 1940. Brig. G.r. turner, Brig. [H.d.G.] Crerar and Major General Mcnaughton 
leaving for Paris. Mme. Vanier seeing them off. [Library and Archives Canada PA-034127]
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expeditionary force.10 When he stepped down from his post at the end 
of 1940, grateful for the opportunity to move back to a diplomatic 
role in Washington, Campbell had wrote once again to colleagues 
in Whitehall but in an unofficial guise; now free of restrictions, he 
warned that the dominion’s prime minister was “not a war, or a 
warlike, leader, and I sometimes feel Canada’s effort is too flabby.”11 
As he concluded, “the people are keen, or as keen as anyone can 
be at a distance of 3000 miles, and they want to produce men and 
munitions, but politics enters into the picture far too much.”
Mackenzie King’s strategic outlook was based around the 
avoidance of significant casualties amongst Canadian troops and 
reducing the threat of political and social discord amongst the 
sizeable French-speaking population in Quebec who had no real 
sympathy with the British Empire. Fully aware of the potential 
dangers this held, particularly if there were to be any repeat of the 
First World War’s casualty figures, the country’s leader remained 
highly suspicious of Whitehall’s motives. Even so, there were sections 
of domestic public opinion that began to question why Canada was 
not doing more which made it increasingly difficult to avoid a more 
visible demonstration of support to Britain and the war. With some 
reluctance, a division was sent to Europe arriving in Scottish ports 
in December 1939, and, as the Allied position deteriorated rapidly 
following the German attack the following May, their commander, 
Major-General McNaughton, looked to find a role for these troops.12 
He did so in the knowledge that there was now “a considerable body 
of opinion” back at home that was not satisfied with a war effort 
which was viewed as not being an acceptable response to the crisis. 
The criticism was aimed at the government but more particularly the 
prime minister; it was surely no coincidence that he now confided to 
his diary that it was right and proper for Canada to stand by the 
10  Brandey Barton, “Public Opinion and National Prestige: The Politics of Canadian 
Army Participation in the Invasion of Sicily, 1942–1943,” Canadian Military History 
15, no. 2 (Spring, 2006), 23–34; Galen Roger Perras, “No Need to Send an Army 
Across the Pacific: Mackenzie King and the Pacific Conflict, 1939–1945,” in John 
English, Kenneth McLaughlin and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, eds., Mackenzie King: 
Citizenship and Community (Toronto: Robin Brass Studios, 2003), 124–150.
11  Campbell to Batterbee, 20 January 1941, Sir Harry Batterbee Papers, Rhodes 
House Library, Oxford, 6/2.
12  Andrew Stewart, “The Battle for Britain,” History Today 65, no. 6 (June, 2015), 
19–26; Rickard, The Politics of Command, 39–45; W.C. Hankinson (British High 
Commission, Ottawa) to Eric Machtig (DO), 28 May 1940, DO121/112, TNA. 
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mother country in striking what could potentially be “the last blow 
for the preservation of freedom.”13 His determination to pursue a 
limited liability had been undermined and, according to the United 
States ambassador Jay Pierrepoint Moffat, Canada had reached “a 
crossroad” and the recent reverses in Europe had forced changes 
upon it.14 Steps were taken to dispatch a second division and mobilise 
a third (soon to be followed by the main elements of a fourth), 
authorisation was given for troops to be sent for garrison duties in 
Iceland and the West Indies, and four destroyers were committed to 
help support the Royal Navy. Even now the prime minister remained 
reluctant to see the men who had so enthusiastically volunteered 
sent to actual war zones. In June, Parliament approved the National 
Resources Mobilization Act which conscripted Canadians for home 
defence whilst at the same time explicitly confirming that they would 
not serve overseas if they did not want to be sent. 
The defeat of France had, however, apparently led to a realisation 
that this would now be a long war. In July 1940, a significant series 
of changes had taken place affecting the longer term use of Canadian 
military forces as the composition of the Cabinet war committee 
changed. The successor to the short-lived Emergency Council, this 
was responsible for the consideration of questions of general policy 
and the coordination of all operations of the government and, since 
France’s surrender, with regular, often daily meetings, it had taken 
effective control of the country’s war effort.15 Plans badly needed 
some revision as, according to Stacey, the antipathy shown by the 
Canadian leader, most specifically towards the army, had not eased. 
At the end of July, Mackenzie King and five of his Cabinet colleagues 
had made statements on the floor of the House of Commons in 
response to what a watching American observer termed “a growing 
Parliamentary and popular demand for a concise statement in regard 
to Canada’s war effort.”16 Despite this, it was certainly the case that 
13  C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Vol. II: 1921–1948 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1981), 299.
14  Moffat to Department, June 23, 1940, Canada, US Legation and Embassy 
Ottawa, General Records—Chancery, Box 60, RG84, National Archives, Maryland 
(NARA).
15  J.E. Rea, T.A. Crerar: A Political Life (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1997), 205 –206.
16  “Memorandum for the Minister, Summarizing statements by six Cabinet 
Ministers with respect to Canada’s war effort,” 1 August 1940, Canada, US Legation 
and Embassy Ottawa, General Records—Chancery, Box 60, RG84, NARA.
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the chiefs of staff “faced a constant struggle to retain influence in 
ministerial circles.”17 The fact that until June 1942 they continued to 
be excluded from Cabinet war committee meetings, and even at this 
stage an invitation was only extended to attend approximately two 
each month, remains an important consideration.18 As one historian 
has noted, this lack of military input restricted the ability to conduct 
strategic planning and ensured that Mackenzie King remained the 
dominant force in determining how policies and commitments were 
developed.19 
Two key appointments influenced events greatly. The first was 
in June 1940 when Colonel J.L. Ralston became the new minister 
of national defence replacing Norman Rogers, who had been killed 
tragically in an air accident.20 Time magazine described Ralston 
to its American readers as “one of Canada’s cleverest financial 
men” who had refused previously to join the cabinet but was now 
expected “because of his bulldog tenacity and narrow partisanship 
to become the Government’s strongest man.”21 The second important 
appointment saw the recall of Crerar from England, where he had 
been chief of staff at the Canadian military headquarters (cmhq) 
London, to become chief of the general staff (cgs). This was the 
key wartime role and he would subsequently be remembered as 
“unquestionably the most important Canadian soldier in the war.”22 
Following his return home, Crerar almost immediately attended a war 
committee meeting in Ottawa on 26 July 1940 at which he presented 
his assessment of the situation in Britain.23 This involved a review 
of various possible developments during which he emphasised that 
“Canada’s chief concern, in existing circumstances, was the British 
Isles; they were her best defensive line, and it was in her interest 
17  Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939–1945, 
129.
18  Paul D. Dickson, “The Politics of Army Expansion: General H.D.G. Crerar and 
the Creation of the First Canadian Army, 1940–41,” The Journal of Military History 
60, no. 2 (April, 1996), 276.
19  Ibid.
20  “Obituary—Norman McLeod Rogers, 1894–1940,” Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science 6, no. 3 (August, 1940), 476–478.
21  “All In,” Time, 18 September 1940.
22  J.L. Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders in 
the Second World War (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 83.
23  Colonel C.P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939–1945: An Official Historical 
Summary (Ottawa: The King’s Printer, 1948), 28; Granatstein, The Generals, 93–95.
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to give every possible assistance in maintaining it against Hitler.”24 
He repeated an earlier conversation with General John Dill, chief of 
the imperial general staff (cigs), in which the senior British military 
officer had told him that the chances were sixty-forty that Germany 
would try and invade Britain within the next six weeks.25 Crerar’s 
conclusion was that in the first instance the maximum effort should 
be made to defend Britain, but, some thought should also be given 
about what contribution could be made later to defeating Germany. 
Hence, his recommendation that whilst the focus would be on sending 
more troops to the British Isles, the future development of suitable 
armoured formations should also be given a priority. With Dill having 
also told him that, if Britain was defeated, the Royal Navy would 
have to move its headquarters to Canada’s Atlantic coast, Crerar also 
urged that every measure be taken to prepare harbours and coast 
defences for this potential outcome.26
Writing later to McNaughton, who had been in Britain since the 
previous December in command of the expanding Canadian military 
forces based in the country, Crerar confided that he had “found that 
as a result of a rather panicky outlook, the tendency [in Ottawa] was 
to look inward and think in terms of strict ‘continental’ defence.”27 
He had worked on this “defeatist attitude” and believed that “to a 
considerable extent both in the War Cabinet and publicly … during 
the last month or so the accent has been placed on the ‘fortress 
Island’ being our first line of defence rather than the Atlantic sea-
board.” The clearest evidence of this ‘change’ could be seen within 
the two detailed appreciations he produced on consecutive dates 
in late September 1940, both of which sought to consider how the 
Canadian Army would develop over the coming years and the role 
for which it would be used. The first of these outlined how the cgs 
saw the expansion of the army taking place.28 According to Stacey 
his conclusion, based upon the recent experience of observing the 
French campaign, was that “an army of defensive type was bound 
24  Stacey, Six Years of War – Volume 1, 87-91.
25  J.W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record; Volume 1, 1939–1944 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1960), 129.
26  Ibid.
27  Crerar to McNaughton, 8 August/9 September 1940, McNaughton Papers, MG30 
E133, Series III, Vol. 227, LAC.
28  “Canadian Army Programme for 1941,” 24 September 1940, Ralston Papers, 
MG27, Series III, B11, Vol. 37, LAC.
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to meet defeat.” This meant the development of a force based 
around modern artillery, armour, and close-support aircraft and this 
would require the country’s industrial capacity to be turned over 
to its construction.29 With the assertion that Canada itself was not 
threatened so long as Britain was not overrun, this document also 
argued that the new modern Canadian military organisation should 
therefore be assembled at the empire’s heart although this could 
only be done once it had been adequately equipped. It would consist 
of three infantry divisions, to be formed by early-1941 as a corps, 
with an armoured brigade to join it as soon as possible and another 
infantry division ready to proceed to Britain if required.30
The second paper, “What should be the Nature of Canada’s 
Military Effort during the next year?,” sought to examine the strategic 
position of the dominion and the role that should be undertaken by 
Canadian forces.31 Its central position was that all Canadian planning 
should be an integral part of the war effort of the wider empire and, 
as such, for the following twelve months, it should be based generally 
on the views of the British chiefs of staff. Prominent reference was 
therefore given to the conclusion that, for 1941, the strategy was to 
be one of attrition and recovering those British Imperial territories 
that had been lost, whilst taking every step to hold on to those that 
remained; the empire was to be prepared to go on the offensive in the 
spring of the following year. In reviewing possible courses of action 
open to the Axis, it was indicated that attacks could be expected 
against Egypt. Indeed Crerar assessed that “all things considered” 
this would “seem to be the most probable course for the enemy to 
adopt” and the coming winter season would be the most likely time 
for this to take place.32 The Near East would therefore most likely 
be the zone of active operations at least until the following spring, 
when there would be a renewed prospect of an attempted invasion of 
Britain. The British interest in undertaking “decisive action against 
Italy herself and invasion of her African colonies” was referenced 
29  Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939–1945, 28.
30  Ibid.
31  “What should be the Nature of Canada’s Military Effort during the next year?,” 
25 September 1940, Crerar Papers, MG30, E157, Vol. 23, LAC.
32  Ibid., 2.
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prominently as was defeating any attack in Libya or across the 
Mediterranean.33 
The prospect of Canadian forces forming part of Egypt’s defences 
was also listed as an option, but it was clear that no firm proposal was 
being made other than the generation of reinforcements and moving 
them to Britain.34 Indeed, it was also stated that only in the spring 
of 1942 could British Commonwealth forces begin to even consider 
anticipating moving to the offensive.35 Crerar’s 1940 correspondence 
with McNaughton had, however, included a reference to a move 
elsewhere, “out of the uk and in some other area of operations where 
the Canadian Corps can better demonstrate its fighting power;” this 
tantalising reference concluded with a promise of confirmation within 
“the next few weeks” and this appeared to provide the details of what 
he was thinking.36 In an anonymous and slightly longer appreciation 
given to Colonel Ralston and simply entitled “Plans,” there was 
further evidence.37 Within it there was a discussion not merely of 
likely future manpower requirements and the possible theatres of war 
but also three clear roles that could be adopted by Canadian forces 
during the winter 1940–41 period. These were, in order: defence of 
the United Kingdom; raids on the continent; and “providing land 
forces to help in defending Egypt or, operating on a new front, if 
one develops, in North Africa.” The appreciations had appeared very 
much to place an emphasis on generating additional forces, both 
infantry and armoured, for despatch to the United Kingdom, without 
offering any actual recommendation as to which specific role they 
would fill, but nothing was ruled out.
The analysis being produced by Crerar and those around him 
was entirely accurate. A key appreciation delivered in the first week of 
September 1940 to the British War Cabinet made prominent reference 
to the strategic significance attached to the Middle East. Presented 
by the chiefs of staff committee and issued under the signature of 
Dudley Pound, John Dill, and Richard Peirse, its purpose was to 
33  “Plans—Appreciations Military Gen. (Secret) 1940–42,” 27 September 1940, 1–2, 
Ralston Papers, MG27 III, B11, Vol. 37, LAC.
34  Ibid., 4.
35  Stacey, Six Years of War, 88.
36  Crerar to McNaughton, 8 August/9 September 1940, A.G.L. McNaughton 
Papers, MG30, E133, Series III, Vol. 227, LAC.
37  “Plans,” 27 September 1940, 4, Ralston Papers, MG27, Series III, B11, Vol. 37, 
LAC.
10
Canadian Military History, Vol. 25 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 14
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol25/iss2/14
  11s t e wa rt 
examine “the factors affecting [Britain’s] ability to defeat Germany, 
and to make recommendations from the military point of view as to 
the policy which should govern our war effort and the future conduct 
of the war.”38 At various points in the document, the Middle Eastern 
threat was highlighted. As Germany needed to secure access to 
additional oil supplies and these would have to come via ship from 
Russia or Romania through the Black Sea, it was thought an attack 
by both of the European Axis partners was “likely” within the next 
six months. The capture of the port of Alexandria would not only 
mean the loss of a key base but also prevent British shipping from 
operating in the Eastern Mediterranean. There was also the added 
advantage of securing access to Egyptian cotton and establishing a 
route through the Suez Canal to provide support to Italian forces in 
Abyssinia. Hence it was considered to be the most likely form of Axis 
attack along with continuing efforts to attack shipping and ports in 
order to halt supplies and more general air attacks at British morale. 
It was also argued that the act of reinforcing the garrisons in the 
Middle East would be likely to prevent the Italians from achieving any 
major military success. The conclusion was that holding the position 
in the Middle East was “of the utmost importance to our strategy” 
both in terms of safeguarding supplies and preventing Germany and 
Italy from breaking the economic blockade which, at this stage in the 
war, was the most potent offensive weapon available to Britain. It 
was argued that the sending of reinforcements was “a matter of the 
greatest urgency.”
On the first day of October 1940, the Cabinet war committee 
gathered in Ottawa and the main item for discussion was Canada’s 
contribution to the Allied war effort for the coming year. Mackenzie 
King’s diaries provide the clearest insight into how the debate 
developed, at least in his eyes. He remained adamant, despite the 
earlier comments committing to greater troop numbers, that the 
air force should remain the largest Canadian contribution with the 
navy next.39 As he put it “All present were agreed I think to that.” 
This was not true of Crerar who pressed for an increase for the 
army which, he and his supporters believed, could be used more 
actively and the Canadian leader made reference to Crerar wanting 
38  “War Cabinet—Future Strategy,” WP(40)362, 4 September 1940, CAB66/11/42, 
TNA.
39  Mackenzie King Diary, 1 October 1940, f.902, MG26-J13, LAC.
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“to have a Canadian Army serving in the Middle East, Africa and 
elsewhere.”40 This was apparently not what the premier wanted to 
hear and he remained dismissive of such calls, using as his principal 
counter arguments the possibilities of the United States’ continuing 
lack of involvement in the war and developments in the Pacific of a 
negative nature. This not particularly persuasive approach concluded 
with a reversion to fiscal concerns and the argument that manpower 
and finance should be “put to the best advantage possible.” 
No more seems to have been said on the subject at this meeting, 
but, by the first week of December 1940, the internal discussion had 
become much more acute and domestic pressure appeared to have 
grown considerably. By November 1940 the Canadian media based 
in London were clamouring for any information about the role being 
played by the country’s troops. As one historian has commented, the 
little Canadian army “squatted in England much like an aborigine 
in a strange wilderness, self-conscious but safe; fulfilment of that 
promise to be ‘at Britain’s side.’”41 Even the decision to send a 
detachment of sappers to Gibraltar saw them approach the Ministry 
of Information and ask that they be “given an ‘even break’” if any 
formal announcement was to be made with some advance notice.42 
Canadians back at home were said to be “peering out from behind 
the rather unexciting cloak of hemispheric defence” which left them 
“attracted by the glitter of Wavell’s victories in the Western Desert 
and the potentially rapid collapse of Italian military power in North 
Africa.”43 There was also some suggestion in other parts of the British 
Empire that if Canadian troops joined with the other dominion forces 
fighting in this theatre there would be a better case for resurrecting 
the old Imperial War Cabinet, an idea that was bitterly opposed by 
Mackenzie King.44 He was in “no hurry to undermine his personal 
position” and could not see any value to reversing the previously 
agreed policy and “earmarking Canadian forces for operations which 
40  Ibid.
41  Preston, “Canada and the Higher Direction of the Second World War,” 34.
42  Canadian Military Headquarters GS Branch War Diary, 28 November 1940, WO 
179/1, TNA.
43  Preston, “Canada and the Higher Direction of the Second World War,” 37.
44  Andrew Stewart, Empire Lost; Britain, the Dominions and the Second World 
War (London: Continuum, 2008), 51–54.
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would bring no immediate political advantages either at home or 
abroad.”45
Another three hour Cabinet War Committee meeting held at 
this point was recorded in the premier’s diary as having been “rather 
difficult and trying,” no doubt because the question was raised once 
again of Canadian forces being dispatched from England to the 
Middle East.46 At this point, with Operation Compass the first major 
British Commonwealth offensive of the North African campaign 
about to start, the Western Desert appeared an obvious focus for 
attention. Mackenzie King’s view was that the defence department 
was “engineering” this debate, despite the opposition of the War 
Council, and such talk could lead to “annexionist (sic) sentiment 
growing up” although the argument he put forward once again seemed 
far from convincing. This meeting took place after Ralston had left 
for England, along with the Minister of Munitions and Supply C.D. 
Howe, and saw the prime minister once again strongly stating views 
that appeared almost completely at odds with the advice being issued 
from his senior army advisor. He instead chose to highlight that the 
other dominions were “all interested in that zone” and, although he 
did not explicitly say so, it was clear that it was not a theatre in 
which he had any interest.47 There was, however, by now a good deal 
of support amongst others for just this idea, notably from Charles 
‘Chubby’ Power, the minister of national defence for air, and James 
Gardiner, minister for national war service. They were prepared to 
back “the army people” arguing that the armed forces stationed 
overseas were anxious to fight, morale was suffering because of the 
lack of fighting and they should therefore be sent to where they could 
at once engage the enemy. With the prime minister clearly believing 
that the senior military officers had got to his Cabinet colleagues, 
there was actually some logic in at least part of what he had to 
say. He was certainly right in claiming that the Australians, New 
Zealanders, and South Africans had a level of interest in the African 
theatre which Canada did not. For the Antipodean members of the 
Commonwealth alliance this was a region in which they had fought 
45  Preston, “Canada and the Higher Direction of the Second World War,” 37.
46  Mackenzie King Diary, 4 December 1940, f.1037, MG26-J13, LAC. 
47  Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record; Volume 1, 156; Mackenzie King’s lack of 
enthusiasm for a North African expedition receives only this briefest of references in 
Pickersgill’s epic recounting of the premier’s diaries.
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during the last war and the defence of Suez was of course strategically 
of vital significance to them in terms of their home security. For Jan 
Smuts, the South African leader, future developments in Africa were 
of direct interest as he pondered the continent’s post-war future.48 
For Canada there was no similar rationale to become involved.
What it appeared to come down to, was Mackenzie King’s 
reluctance for there to be any expansion of Canadian involvement 
in the war. As he wrote in his diary, he had simply told the meeting 
that they “owed it to our men to seek to protect their lives,” although 
he did not go on to say it this was best achieved in his view by not 
sending them to fight in North Africa’s deserts. 49 At the same time 
the obvious and logical role was to continue to help defend Britain 
as had been concluded in the earlier appreciations.50 As these noted, 
if no attempt at invasion was made in 1940, from mid-April of the 
following year, the threat would once again become imminent.51 And 
in this line of his argument he had support from Angus Macdonald, 
minister of national defence for naval services, and Ernest Lapointe, 
the minister of justice. The challenge remained, however, that not 
everybody agreed, as was highlighted by the Toronto Daily Star 
with its front page report that a decision would soon be taken as 
to whether Canadian troops would be sent to North Africa.52 The 
December 1940 story reported that it had previously been the case 
that “high Canadian officers” had opposed the idea of their troops 
being moved from the British home front to the Mediterranean, 
because it was believed that the war would be won or lost on the 
basis of the ability to defend Britain and then by re-invading Europe 
to attack Germany. This view was said to have changed as a result of 
the successes of the Royal Navy at the Battle of Taranto and the skill 
48  John Agar-Hamilton to Basil Liddell Hart, 14 February 1959, Liddell Hart 
Papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, London, LH 4/39.
49  Mackenzie King Diary, 4 December 1940, f.1037, MG26-J13, LAC.
50  General Crerar had sat next to Ambassador Moffat at a dinner held in Ottawa 
in July 1940 and at this he confirmed to him that as the Canadian Corps was the 
only fully trained unit not to lose most of its equipment during the withdrawal from 
France it “was now considered the strongest individual unit in the British Army;” 
“Memorandum of conversation with General Crerar, the new Canadian Chief of 
Staff, Ottawa,” 25 July 1940, Box 60, NARA.
51  “Plans,” 27 September 1940, 2, Ralston Papers, MG27, Series III, B11, Vol. 37, 
LAC.
52  “Canadians May Get Honor of Polishing Off Italy,” Toronto Daily Star, 2 
December 1940.
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shown by the Greeks in blunting the Italian invasion. In a typically 
mischievous piece of newspaper writing it was therefore suggested 
that the visit of Ralston and Crerar to London, which was then 
taking place, might result in a decision.
Colonel Ralston and his cgs were indeed in Britain and just 
before Christmas 1940 they met the Secretary of State for War 
Anthony Eden and other senior British figures for what proved to 
be a crucial meeting. The outcome of this was a confirmation that 
Canada’s maximum contribution for the first half of the following 
year would be a fully staffed corps of three divisions along with 
a tank brigade. And, during the latter half of 1941 and the first 
quarter of 1942, an armoured division would also be provided.53 In 
anticipation of this meeting an internal briefing document had been 
prepared within the War Office in London although it is not clear as 
to the actual identity of the writer.54 Its tone was at times caustic, 
notably with the conclusion that there was some urgency about using 
Canadian troops already in Britain as they were “eating their heads 
off” hence there was a need to “give them some employment which 
would serve as an outlet for their energy.” It was also acknowledged 
that with Australians and New Zealanders serving in the Middle 
East there was “a certain amount of inter-Dominion feeling” about 
their static role. The note therefore outlined four possible roles which 
were broadly similar to those identified previously by Crerar, the 
principal difference being the potential employment of Canadian 
troops in ‘irregular operations.’ The Middle East was listed as the 
first possible option, but there were said to be serious objections 
not least because this would entail splitting the country’s contingent 
“with little hope of re-constitution at a later date.” Canada had also 
established base installations and moved its reinforcements to Britain 
at great expense and an onwards move to the Middle East might “not 
be well received.” As such it was argued that it made most sense 
for the country’s troops to be employed on the Atlantic sea-board, 
specifically in Britain, the Iberian Peninsula, or north-west Africa. 
The unknown writer concluded by noting that such assessments it 
53  “Notes (by Harry Crerar) on Discussion held at War Office 1700 hrs—17 Dec 
1940,” 18 December 1940, War Diary 1940, A.G.L. McNaughton Papers, MG30, 
E133, Series III, Vol. 248, LAC; Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939–1945, 29.
54  “Possible Employment for Canadian Formations,” Hand of Officer, 25 November 
1940, WO106/4872, TNA.
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did not really matter as insufficient shipping meant Canadian forces 
could not be moved from Britain for a considerable time. This focus 
on the defence of the United Kingdom and building up sufficient 
forces to contribute towards longer-term strategic objectives was 
therefore very much in line with requests coming from the War Office 
in London.
Ralston claimed that, during his London visit, he had encountered 
“no thought or desire to have Canadian troops go to Egypt.”55 As he 
told Mackenzie King, the intention was that Britain would continue 
to send large numbers of men to fight overseas, and she looked to 
Canada to help fill their places. So, while additional manpower 
was greatly needed, it was to be sent no further than the British 
Isles where it would wait to be used at some later stage.56 It was 
therefore approved that the year’s army programme would be shaped 
specifically around the requirements confirmed by the War Office. 
At no stage was reference made to any of this being intended for 
55  Mackenzie King Diary, 24 January 1941, f.69, MG26-J13, LAC.
56  Ibid.
Mackenzie King and 
Mcnaughton at Aldershot, 
August 1941. [Library and 
Archives Canada C-18246]
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possible use in the Middle East. Indeed, Crerar produced a draft 
programme that he believed would find favour with his prime 
minister and those around him who wanted the defence focus to be 
on industrial development, hence its reference to the extension of the 
training period for troops as well as the significance it attached to the 
development of mechanised warfare and the need for more armoured 
units.57 His skilful championing of this revised strategic vision helped 
secure Mackenzie King’s endorsement which, with Ralston providing 
enthusiastic assistance, ensured that the proposals would be broadly 
accepted.58 The proposed composition reflected the general’s longer-
term aspirations “to increase its [the military’s] influence and the size 
of its forces” and most likely points to the real reason behind much 
of his interest in the Middle East campaigns, a negotiating point to 
achieve his ultimate aspiration. For all those senior figures in the 
Canadian and British military and government who were involved, 
their respective goals were well served by the agreements that were 
reached; any actual involvement in the Middle East would not have 
been in their respective interests unless this could have resulted in a 
decisive and rapid victory with little in the way of casualties or loss 
of equipment.
Throughout the first half of 1941 there was only limited reference 
to the North African campaign. In a February statement to the 
Canadian House of Commons, Mackenzie King announced that 
during the previous three months 30,000 “units of armoured and other 
automotive equipment” had been delivered to the Middle East.59 With 
the situation worsening following Germany’s military intervention 
and the arrival of the Afrika Korps commanded by General Erwin 
Rommel, Moffat spoke with Crerar at an April lunch about the same 
subject.60 He already knew from previous conversations that the 
Canadian general did not favour dispersing those forces which were 
already overseas but the American ambassador now asked his guest if 
he thought there might be some pressure from the British authorities 
to transfer Canadian troops to the Middle East or even Greece. In 
response Crerar confirmed that there had been no suggestion made by 
57  Dickson, “The Politics of Army Expansion,” 285.
58  Ibid., 286–288.
59  “Memorandum: Isolated Facts concerning Canada’s War Effort,” 13 February 
1941 (US Legation and Embassy, Ottawa), Box 71, RG84, NARA.
60  Ibid., “Memorandum of Conversation with General Crerar, Ottawa, 17 April 
1941.”
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the British authorities, partly because of the time element and partly 
because there was not enough shipping available to transport large 
numbers of men to the eastern Mediterranean. Crerar’s estimation 
was that, with all the equipment of a modern division, it would take 
ten to fifteen tons of shipping per man. That same month, Malcolm 
MacDonald, the new British high commissioner, gave a Sunday night 
radio address to the Canadian public in which he tried to explain 
why Canadian troops were being kept in Britain.61 As he put it, 
they had been trained for defensive operations and given the place 
of honour at “the spearhead of that defence,” a strange mixture of 
fighting roles if ever there was one. 
In reporting these comments, the Toronto Daily Star appeared 
now to recant on its earlier criticism and offered its own analysis 
about the “unhappy speculation” that had questioned why Canada’s 
troops remained in Britain when soldiers from the other dominions 
were fighting in North Africa and Greece. The view was offered that, 
“the sense of disappointment has perhaps been natural that it has 
not been the result of clear thinking. It has not been the result of 
visualising the war picture as a whole but rather of concentrating 
upon those theatres in which there has been the greatest action.”62 
Finally, during a May debate, a Canadian parliamentarian posed the 
rhetorical question as to why his country’s troops had not been in the 
Libyan desert.63 Frederick MacKenzie was a Liberal who had seen 
service in Egypt and at Gallipoli during the First World War. He 
now put forward two reasons as to why it was that only Anzac forces 
“were chasing Italians over the sands of North Africa.” Apart from 
repeating MacDonald’s comments he also suggested that it would 
not have been prudent to send men used to Canada’s climate to 
campaign in a place with so different a one. The issue was being 
contained, but Crerar was conscious that it was beginning to have an 
adverse effect on public confidence in the army.64
A further visit to London by Colonel Ralston in October 1941 
saw the Canadian role discussed once again. According to one well 
researched account, ever since his arrival nearly two years earlier, 
61  “Why Canadian Troops are in Britain Still,” Toronto Daily Star, 30 April 1941.
62  Ibid.
63  “The Budget—Mr MacKenzie (Neepawa),” House of Commons, 6 May 1941, 
Debates—House of Commons, Volume III, 1941, 2593–2594.
64  Dickson, “The Politics of Army Expansion,” 288–290.
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McNaughton had faced the problem of “finding feasible military 
operations to participate in with the rapidly expanding British Army” 
and, during this intervening period, whilst he had been willing to 
fight he was determined to keep his forces fighting together.65 Now he 
was told by the Assistant cigs, General Gordon Macready, that there 
was still no plan to send Canadian forces in the United Kingdom 
to “a distant theatre of operations,” repeating the discussion that 
had taken place between Churchill and Mackenzie King during the 
latter’s August visit to Britain.66 This decision was in large part based 
around the belief that Germany still posed a potent threat to the 
home islands; the assessment was that Hitler could concentrate his air 
and land forces more quickly than adequate British Commonwealth 
forces could be recovered from overseas to deter him. There was also 
a concern that any despatch of the Canadian Corps would encourage 
an invasion attempt—the Canadians would therefore stay, in part to 
provide a significant counter-attack force but also to act as a visible 
deterrent. It was also clear from discussions amongst the Canadians 
that there continued to be considerable concerns about the effect of 
splitting the corps to conduct operations in a theatre such as the 
Middle East.67 Crerar and McNaughton agreed that whilst such a 
move would be well received by the Canadian public, it would not 
resolve the bigger question of how overseas forces could best be used 
and would inevitably lower the morale of those troops who were 
retained in Britain.
There was also another consideration, “the extreme suitability” 
of Canadian forces for commando operations and large-scale raids, 
something that had first been raised during the visit the previous 
December. At lunch Major-General John Kennedy, the director of 
military operations at the War Office, provided McNaughton with 
details on past and potential future operations and it was clear from 
their conversation that the Canadians were being considered in this 
role.68 In a later discussion with Ralston and Crerar, some details 
were offered about British plans for the dominion’s forces including a 
possible role assisting in the defence of Spain or Spanish Morocco and 
65  Rickard, The Politics of Command, 46–53.
66  “Personal War Diary, G.O.C.-in-C. First Canadian Army,” 14 October 1941, 
A.G.L. McNaughton Papers, MG30, E157, Vol. 23, LAC.
67  Ibid., 25 October 1941.
68  Ibid.
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“temporary employment” in operations in Norway. In addition to this, 
and with the exception of minor raids, “no specific operations were 
under consideration.” The Canadian commander also repeated that 
there had been no reference to using part of the corps in a theatre 
such as the Middle East.69 David Margesson, the secretary of state 
for war, had already confirmed to Ralston that there still remained a 
focus on keeping enough forces in Britain to withstand any potential 
invasion, with the minimum requirement calculated as twenty-five 
divisions, six of these being armoured formations.70 Supporting this 
contingency plan remained the Canadian main effort. The Canadian 
minister in turn reiterated that his government was “fully prepared” 
to sanction the use of the country’s troops in any military operations 
that were recommended to them from London and, whilst he was not 
pressing for their use, there were “no restrictive tendencies on the 
part of the Canadian Government.”71 At the same time, it was also 
once again repeated that “the most helpful addition to the Canadian 
forces overseas would be in armoured formations;” more than one 
of the British participants spelled this out as meaning an additional 
armoured division. This followed on from a conversation Ralston 
had with General Dill, during which he had described the Canadian 
military role as, firstly “to defend the citadel,” and second to move 
into North Africa, Italy, and Spain, possibly the Middle East and 
for raids.72 In addition there was also the possibility of exploiting 
“uprisings in occupied territories” although expecting any of these at 
this stage would be premature.
Ralston recorded in his diary entry of the meeting with Margesson 
that he had “referred to the employment of Canadians and said I 
wanted to repeat what had been said over and over again, namely, 
that Canadians were for service wherever and whenever they could 
best be used.”73 Suggesting that they be used “simply to quieten 
public opinion” was not something he was willing to do but the 
merits of the situation would dictate; this assessment was readily 
agreed upon by the British minister. At the following meeting with 
him the next week he was told that the “chief necessity was the 
69  Ibid.
70  Ibid., Personal War Diary, 20 October 1941.
71  “Diary—Wednesday, 15th October 1941,” English Trips (Fall, 1941), Ralston 
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maintenance of strategic reserves and use where needed,” and the 
Canadians had not been assigned any of the ‘special tasks’ such as 
the possibility of conducting a raid against the French port of Brest.74 
They also discussed how the retaining of troops in Britain was being 
seen both in Canada and elsewhere. Ralston said that some people 
were attempting to portray this as a ‘restriction’ on their movement; 
Margesson’s response was to describe this as “an absolute lie” from 
“evilly disposed persons.” Yet, at the same time, Ralston also met 
with King George VI who he recorded as being “a little itchy” about 
the lack of activity, although it was not clear whether this referred 
specifically to the Canadian forces or if it was a comment about the 
general progress of the war.75 
Following a meeting with Churchill on 25 October 1941, Ralston’s 
short-hand diary note specifically records the British leader as having 
said “pity to break up Corps—one division to Middle East not 
desirable” before going on to say that he had “in mind some other 
possibilities” although he was not so sure about these.76 He went on 
to say in reference to events then taking place at Tobruk that it was 
not “our [British] fault and not yours [Canadian]—knows boys want 
to get at him [Hitler]—opportunity will come—They also serve who 
only stand and wait.”77 This view was obviously commonly known as 
it was reiterated in a conversation between Moffat and MacDonald 
in October 1941, shortly after the British high commissioner had 
returned from a visit to London.78 In his report back to Washington 
the American ambassador reported that the British diplomat had 
urged Churchill “to send at least some Canadian troops into the 
fighting line.” This recommendation had been put forward for the 
benefit it would have on the morale of the troops and the Canadian 
public, but the British leader refused “point blank” saying that he 
was not planning to disrupt other units or supply lines by “adding a 
small group of Canadians here and there.” Only the month before, 
he had expressed concern that Britain would be seen as “seeming 
74  Ibid., “Diary—Monday, 20th October, 1941.”
75  Ibid., “Diary—Tuesday, 21st October, 1941.”
76  Ibid., “Diary (Churchill—25/10/41).”
77  Ibid.
78  “Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, British High 
Commissioner to Canada,” Strictly Confidential, Ottawa, 18 October 1942 (Canada, 
US Legation and Embassy Ottawa, General Records—Chancery), Box 71, RG84, 
NARA.
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to fight all our battles in the Middle East only with Dominion 
troops.”79 Whilst this was a private reference to the increasingly 
public dispute the British premier was having with Australia, it may 
well have influenced his thinking; it was entirely in line with a policy 
that had existed for nearly a year.80 At the same time the plans for 
Operation Crusader, the huge British Commonwealth offensive that 
was scheduled to commence the following month, certainly did not 
point to there being any shortages in manpower.
Despite this offensive’s only mixed results, there remained 
no apparent interest for Canadian forces to be sent out to North 
Africa. When McNaughton returned to Ottawa in January 1942 for 
meetings, he brought with him confirmation from the cigs, General 
Sir Alan Brooke, that “it was his wish to employ [Canadian Forces] 
in the defence of [Britain] until such time as operations on the 
Continent of Europe become possible.”81 As the Canadian general 
confided to King George VI during a private meeting in April, it 
remained the intention that the Canadian military were not being 
dispersed but instead concentrated in what he thought was “the 
decisive theatre of war.”82 Nonetheless, the problem of how to keep 
these expanding forces occupied was mounting. With some sections 
of the British media giving prominence to reports of criminal acts 
involving Canadian troops, there were also two occasions during that 
spring when they booed a car carrying Montgomery; with Brooke 
and General Bernard Paget, commander-in-chief home forces, the 
other occupants, McNaughton felt obliged to apologise personally to 
each of them whilst Crerar began an enquiry.83 There was, however, 
also some sympathy shown in other publications where it was noted 
that the role the Canadians continued to play was a necessary one, 
if not always the most fulfilling. The News of the World published 
a leading article in late January 1942, which highlighted the 
“thankless, unspectacular job” they had performed helping guard 
79  Winston Churchill, The Grand Alliance: The Second World War, Volume III 
(London: Cassell and Company, 1950), 367.
80  Stewart, Empire Lost, 66–68.
81  “Memorandum—Personal War Diary, 16 January 1942,” A.G.L. McNaughton 
Papers, MG30, E123, Series III, Vol. 248, LAC.
82  Ibid., “Personal War Diary, 15 April 1942.”
83  Ibid., “Memorandum of a Discussion on 2 Jun 1942 at GHQ Home Forces 
between C-in-C Home Forces and GOC-in-C First Canadian Army,” 8 June 1942.
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Britain and “forced by circumstances beyond their control to remain 
in comparative idleness” whilst the rest of the empire fought.84 
One possible solution was to send two experienced Canadian 
officers to North Africa to act as observers, one to report on operations, 
the other on administrative methods, with the intention that their 
observations would lead to improvements in organisation and training 
of the forces back in Britain. The initial two lieutenant-colonels who 
were selected travelled at the beginning of December 1941 with 
instructions to send monthly reports of what they witnessed in their 
role as observers to the Middle East Forces.85 Later arrangements 
would see much larger numbers of Canadian officers and soldiers 
being attached to Lieutenant-General K.A.N. Anderson’s First Army 
operating in Tunisia where they would gain “invaluable” experience 
and they reported back to McNaughton in June 1942 after several 
months spent in theatre.86 Following on from the disastrous use of 
Canadian forces as part of the August 1942 raid on the French port 
of Dieppe, the decision was taken to send more troops to North 
Africa and the first of five small groups arrived in Algiers in January 
1943 to spend a period of three months attached to units of the First 
British Army. Most were assigned to the 78th Infantry Division and 
the 6th Armoured Division; as the official history notes “at one point 
an infantry unit of the [latter] had a Canadian second-in-command 
and three Canadian company commanders.”87 This arrangement 
continued until the end of the campaign by which point 201 officers 
and 147 non-commissioned officers had seen service and, aside from 
the eight men who were killed, the majority returned to Britain and 
their original units bringing a much greater level of battle experience. 
Indeed Stacey noted that the value of what they learnt was “beyond 
question” despite the limitations that were imposed on the numbers 
84  “Fair Play for Canada’s Fighting Men,” The News of the World, 25 January 1942.
85  Defensor to McNaughton, 19 September 1941, A.G.L. McNaughton Papers, MG 
30, E133, Series III, Vol. 193, LAC; Ibid., Brigadier J.C. Murchie to Lt-Col G.R. 
Bradbrooke and Lt-Col M.P. Bogert, 2 December 1941.
86  C.P. Stacey, “Attachment of Canadian Officers and Soldiers to First British 
Army in Tunisia, 1942–1943,” 18 March 1946, Report No. 95, available: http://www.
cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/cmhq/cmhq095.pdf; Stacey, The 
Canadian Army, 1939–1945, 87–88; “Memorandum of a Discussion with Canadian 
Army Observers on Return from Middle East,” 11 June 1942, Personal War Diary, 
A.G.L. McNaughton Papers, MG30, E123, Series III Vol. 248, LAC.
87  Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939–1945, 90.
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involved.88 Other than the seventeen Royal Canadian Navy corvettes 
to support the Operation torch invasion fleet and follow-up convoys, 
this was the extent of the direct military contribution to the war 
fought in North Africa although much was made post-war that over 
half of the vehicles used by the Eighth Army having been produced 
in Canada.89
The reality was that the absence of its military forces from the 
deserts of North Africa was in many respects a welcome outcome both 
for senior Canadian and British military and political leaders. Indeed, 
whilst never being acknowledged as such, it was an arrangement 
that was in everybody’s interests. At no point did the senior British 
commanders in theatre indicate that they were short of manpower. 
Troops from the other dominions, alongside the Indian Army and 
assorted other Allied contingents, ultimately proved sufficient to 
defeat their German and Italian opponents. At the same time there 
were perhaps also some concerns amongst the planners in London 
about the potential propaganda value to the Axis of having Canadian 
88  Stacey, Six Years of War, 248–249.
89  Terry Copp, “The Mediterranean Theatre,” Legion Magazine, January/
February 1997; “A Record of Great Achievement: The Commonwealth and Empire’s 
Contribution to Victory,” The Commonwealth and Empire Review 79, no. 513 (June–
August 1945), 21–22.
HMCs weyburn in 1942. The corvette was lost to a mine off Gibralter while supporting 
Operation torch. [Library and Archives Canada r112-5991-4-e]
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troops join the remainder of the Commonwealth coalition that had 
been assembled in the North African deserts. When Ambassador 
Moffat had spoken with his British counterpart MacDonald in 
December 1942 he had been told that it was General McNaughton 
who bore the responsibility for there being no Canadian troops in 
the final El Alamein battle “as he insisted that they be maintained 
as a unit.”90 No reference was provided as to his source for this 
conclusion but, by this stage, Crerar and others were already starting 
to doubt McNaughton’s leadership qualities and his reputation began 
to decline until, in December 1943, his resignation was announced to 
a surprised Canadian public.91 
Until recently, the accepted post-war view remained that it was 
McNaughton who had been the driving force in shaping how the 
dominion’s troops in Britain were used.92 Yet it could be argued 
that the ever-expanding Canadian garrison force actually played a 
considerable role in the eventual victory that was won by the Eighth 
90  “Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, British High 
Commissioner,” Ottawa, December 9, 1942 (Canada, US Legation and Embassy 
Ottawa, General Records—Chancery, Box 83, RG84, NARA.
91  Paul D. Dickson, “The Hand that Wields the Dagger: Harry Crerar, First 
Canadian Army Command and National Autonomy,” War and Society 13, no. 2 
(October, 1995), 123–125.
92  Rickard, The Politics of Command, 39.
spitfire pilots of no. 417 squadron, royal Canadian Air Force, planning another operation 
from their airfield at Goubrine in tunisia, April 1943. [© IwM (tr 829)]
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Army. Churchill remained convinced that the deserts of North African 
and the Middle East offered the British Empire’s best opportunity 
to demonstrate its military capabilities to a global audience. Troops 
and equipment could not continue to have been diverted away in the 
quantities that he demanded if they were also needed to guard Britain 
against a potential German threat and it was the Canadian presence 
which allowed him to pursue his vision for a grand strategy. There is, 
however, a question to be asked about what the Canadians could have 
offered in December 1940 to General Archie Wavell’s Western Desert 
Force and Operation Compass which achieved huge initial success 
but culminated just short of the key objective of the port of Tripoli. 
Australians and New Zealanders were shipped from Britain between 
September and December in order to take part in what was seen as 
a potentially critical attack. The arrival of an additional brigade of 
determined dominion troops might have made all the difference in 
terms of changing the outcome of the entire campaign. Mackenzie 
King could even have been able to claim a decisive military victory 
at virtually no political cost but this was not to be.
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
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